Peer Review: A Free Rider Problem built on Reciprocal Altruism and Professional Norms

This post discusses how the practice of peer review is a free-rider problem sustained by reciprocal altruism and professional norms.
Behavioural Science
Author

Nien Xiang Tou

Published

April 13, 2026

With the proliferation of journals and manuscript submissions, peer review in scientific publishing is allegedly facing a crisis, as it has become increasingly difficult to secure reviewers in a timely manner, leading to longer review times. In this blog post, I share my thoughts on whether peer review is a free-rider problem sustained by reciprocal altruism and professional norms.

Image generated using artificial intelligence via Google Gemini.

The Pillar of Scientific Publishing

The practice of peer review was claimed to first begin in the 17th century and has become a cornerstone of modern-day scientific publishing. It refers to the process by which a scholarly manuscript is evaluated by your peers (i.e., experts in the same field) to assess its quality and suitability for publication. This practice forms the foundation of quality control and credibility in scientific publishing by ensuring that all published research have been scrutinised by other knowledgeable members of the academic community.

Typically, beyond desk rejection, every manuscript submission to a peer-reviewed journal is subjected to review by at least two independent individuals. Such peer review practice operates largely on a voluntary basis. Fellow academics are invited by journal editors to evaluate manuscripts in their area of expertise, typically without financial compensation or any other strong incentives.

Peer Review Crisis

The peer review system is increasingly described as being in crisis, as the rapid growth in journals and manuscript submissions outpaces the willingness and availability of qualified reviewers (Horta and Jung 2024). Given the famous academic aphorism of ‘publish or perish’, publishing is central to progression of a research career, making high submission volumes unsurprising. However, the supply of reviewers is failing to keep pace with this demand. This imbalance inevitably burdens the entire system, resulting in an undesirable situation of longer review times and delays in the publication process.

Free-rider Problem

Theoretically, the peer review system would remain in equilibrium if researchers contributed to reviewing in proportion to their manuscript submissions. The persistence of a crisis, however, suggests that contributions are uneven, with some individuals reviewing less than they submit. This phenomenon is not exactly surprising if we think of peer review as a public good that everyone benefits from but no one is strictly required to contribute to. All researchers benefit from having their work reviewed, yet each has an incentive to prioritise publishing over reviewing, since the latter is time-consuming and often unrecognised and unrewarded. The asymmetry between the collective need for reviewers and individual incentives leads to a lacking supply of reviewers. From a utility-maximising individual perspective, it arguably makes rational sense to exhibit such ‘selfish’ behaviour and be a free-rider.

Reciprocal Altruism and Professional Norm

Based on classical economic theory, a system that allows free riding will predict zero contribution. However, Richard Thaler long noted that such predictions of rational selfishness are often violated in reality and humans often cooperate in the context of public goods (Thaler and Imas 2025). Indeed, in the academic world, many researchers contribute to the peer reviewing process on a voluntary basis despite the lack of incentives to do so. This seemingly ‘irrational’ behaviour could be attributed to two plausible explanations.

First, the peer review system may be sustained on the concept of reciprocal altruism, where individuals help others with the expectation that the favour will be returned in the future. In academia, researchers may agree to review manuscripts because they rely on the broader community to review their own work in the future. After all, publishing is a repeated activity over the course of a research career. Experiencing the benefits of reviewing from others can reinforce this ‘give-and-take’ dynamic, encouraging further compliance to the system.

Second, reviewing can also be understood as a product of social and professional norms. The quality of a journal publication has been argued to be the collective responsibility of both readers and authors, and academics are expected to have the professional interests to uphold this (Grainger 2007). Although this expectation is informal, researchers may be encouraged to participate in peer review based on this shared norm of what it means to be a response member of the academic community.

Is Voluntary Reviewing Fair?

Another important consideration is the role of fairness in shaping peer reviewing behaviour. With the growing prevalence of open-access journals and often substantial article-processing charges, the publishing model is increasingly questioned for relying on unpaid reviewer labour while generating significant revenue. Perceptions of this imbalance can influence one’s willingness to contribute. Evidence from behavioural economics, such as the popular ultimatum game, shows that individuals are often willing to forgo their own utility to punish actions considered to be unfair. In the context of peer review, even if academics are motivated by reciprocal expectations and professional norms, a sense that the system is inequitable may reduce their willingness to review, thereby weakening the cooperative foundations on which the system depends.

In the recently published ‘The Winner’s Curse’, Richard Thaler and Alex Imas wrote that “the world is a better place if people cooperate, even if doing so may seem to be selfishly foolish.” The peer review system ultimately depends on this willingness to cooperate. It can be sustained when enough individuals choose to contribute rather than free-ride, drawing on norms of reciprocity and professional responsibility. However, these foundations cannot be taken for granted. If the system is perceived as unfair, the motivation to cooperate may erode, undermining the very behaviours that keep peer review functioning.

References

Grainger, David W. 2007. “Peer Review as Professional Responsibility: A Quality Control System Only as Good as the Participants.” Biomaterials 28 (34): 5199–5203. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biomaterials.2007.07.004.
Horta, Hugo, and Jisun Jung. 2024. “The Crisis of Peer Review: Part of the Evolution of Science.” Higher Education Quarterly 78 (4): e12511. https://doi.org/10.1111/hequ.12511.
Thaler, Richard H., and Alex Imas. 2025. The winner’s curse: behavioral economics anomalies, then and now. New York: Simon & Schuster.